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INTRODUCTION

The most important element of any judicial establishment is the
caliber of its personnel. "The law as administered cannot be better
than the judge who expounds it."' Accordingly, the means used to
select the judiciary is crucial to the foundation of the American legal
system.

*EditorsNote: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
Spring 1991.
1. A. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 11-12 (1955). In agreement with
this view, Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote, "[t]here is no guaranty of justice ...
except the
personality of the judge." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 16-17 (1921)

(quoting Ehrlich, Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects, in 9 MODERN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 65 (1969)); see also Overton, Trial Judges and PoliticalElections:
A Time for Re-examination, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL1Y 9, 9 (1988-89) (stating that "[tihe
quality of justice in Florida depends on the quality of its judiciary").
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Presently, United States jurisdictions implement three judicial
selection methods. Twenty-three states popularly elect nearly all levels
of their judiciaries, 2 while seventeen states select judges strictly by
legislative or executive appointment.3 The remaining ten states employ
a hybrid approach combining popular election and appointment. 4
Florida falls into the third category: the Governor appoints all appellate
judges while the public elects trial judges. 5
2. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 210-12 (1990-91).
Some of these states allow temporary gubernatorial appointment to replace retired or removed
judges. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10. In 1976, the Florida legislature passed and placed on the
ballot a proposed amendment to article V of the Florida Constitution to require retention
elections for all appellate judges in Florida. See Overton, supra note 1, at 13 n.20. Article V,
§ 10, provides, in relevant part:
Section 10. Retention; election and terms. (a) Any justice of the supreme court or any judge of a district court of appeal
may qualify for retention by a vote of the electors. . . When a justice of the
supreme court or a judge of a district court of appeal so qualifies, the ballot shall
read substantially as follows: "Shall Justice (or Judge) (name of justice or judge)
of the (name of the court) be retained in office?" If a majority of the qualified
electors voting within the territorial jurisdiction of the court vote to retain, the
If a majority of the
justice or judge shall be retained for a term of six years ....
qualified electors voting within the territorial jurisdiction of the court vote to not
retain, a vacancy shall exist in that office upon the expiration of the term being
served by the justice or judge.
(b) Circuit judges and judges of county courts shall be elected by vote of the
qualified electors within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The
terms of circuit judges shall be for six years. The terms of judges of county courts
shall be for four years.
Id. Article V, § 11, governing judicial vacancies, states, in relevant part:
Section 11. Vacancies. (a) The governor shall fill each vacancy on the supreme court or on a district
court of appeal by appointing ...one of three persons nominated by the appropriate
judicial nominating commission.
(b) The governor shall fill each vacancy on a circuit court or on a county court
by appointing ... one of not fewer than three persons nominated by the appropriate
judicial nominating commission. An election shall be held to fill that judicial office
for the term of the office beginning at the end of the appointed term.
(c) The nominations shall be made within thirty days from the occurrence of a
vacancy unless the period is extended by the governor for a time not to exceed
thirty days. The governor shall make the appointment within sixty days after the
nominations have been certified to him.
(d) There shall be a separate judicial nominating commission as provided by
general law for the supreme court, each district court of appeal, and each judicial
circuit for all trial courts within the circuit.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 105 (1989) (regulating the nonpartisan elections of judicial officers).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss3/6

2

McClellan: Merit Appointment Versus Popular Election: A Reformer's Guide to
FLORIDA'S JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS

The Florida Constitution provides that the qualified electors within
a court's territorial jurisdiction elect circuit and county court judges.6
However, the constitution creates a combined nomination and appointment selection process for supreme court justices and judges of district
courts of appeal.7 A judicial nominating commission initially nominates
these judges. 8 The commission selects three candidates for the judicial
position, and the Governor appoints one of the three nominees.9 Each
nominating commission consists of nine members: three Florida Bar
members appointed by the Bar's governing board, three electors appointed by the Governor, and three non-Florida Bar members appointed by a majority vote of the six previously appointed commission
members.' 0
Although Florida's plan attempts to strike a middle ground, the
plan leaves both advocates of popular election and advocates of merit
appointment dissatisfied. Presently, proponents of merit appointment,
the method already used to select Florida's appellate judges, are seeking to amend Florida's Constitution to remove all state judges from
the popular election process." The Commission on the Merit Selection
and Retention of Trial Judges, established by The Florida Bar Association, has formally recommended that the state legislature approve
the amendments.12
"Merit" plan advocates opposing popular elections argue that the
increasing cost of judicial campaigns and the need for an independent
judiciary are the leading arguments for adoption of the plan."s Specifically, proponents cite a recent decision by a Florida district court of
appeal to illustrate the potential conflict.' 4 In Breakstone v. MacKenzie,' 5 the Third District Court of Appeal held that a $500 campaign
contribution by plaintiffs counsel to the re-election campaign of the

6.

FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b).
7. Id. § 11(a).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 20(c)(5); see also Little, An Overview of the HistoricalDevelopment of the Judicial
Article of the Florida Constitution, 19 STET. L. REV. 1, 30 (1989) (arguing that the judicial
nominating commissions have enhanced the power of the state Bar and diluted the Governor's
power in judicial appointments).
11. See THE FLORIDA BAR, REPORT OF THE FLA. BAR COMM'N ON MERIT SELECTION
AND RETENTION OF TRIAL JUDGES (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter COMfMISSION ON MERIT SELECTION].

12. Id. at 16-17.
13. Id. at 18-23.
14. See id. at 19.
15. 561 So. 2d 1164 (3d D.C.A. 1989), modified 565 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1990).
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presiding judge constituted a legally sufficient ground for judicial disqualification. 16 Although subsequently reversed by the Florida Supreme Court,17 the case served as a strong rallying cry for removing
trial court judges from the competitive election process., s The
Breakstone controversy may ultimately become the catalyst for replacing judicial elections with merit selection and retention for trial judges
in Florida. 19 At a minimum, Breakstone reintroduced this divisive issue
to Florida's political agenda.
Since the initial structuring of American judicial selection, scholars
have considered how to reconcile a nonelected and unaccountable
judiciary with democratic government principles. ° The basic arguments of this jurisprudential debate trace back to the time of Hamilton
and Jefferson.21 However, this note will not seek to rehash constitutional arguments, but will analyze the various judicial selection
methods. Part II of this note recounts the history of judicial selection
in medieval England, colonial America and Florida. Part III analyzes
issues arising in debate about judicial selection, and part IV discusses
how perceptions of the courts' role influence this debate. In part V,
this note discusses both theoretical observation and practical application of the merit appointment method, while part VI similarly analyzes
the popular election of judges. Lastly, part VII advocates the judicial
selection method this author deems most appropriate for Florida's
judiciary.
II.

HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION

A.

Medieval England

In Medieval England judges played an integral part in feudal
monarchies.- These "assistant kings" exercised the king's authority

16. Id. at 1166.
17. MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, 565 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1990). Justice Overton,
concurring in result only, accused the majority of attempting to preserve the popular election
of trial judges at the expense of improperly interpreting the legal standard for judicial disqualification. Id. at 1341 (Overton, J., concurring in result only).
18. See, e.g., Muir, Breakstone v. MacKenzie: A Keystone Case for Judicial Election Reform, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1990, at 34; Remsen, Is Merit Selection and Retention a Good Idea?
Yes: We'll Get Better Judges, Fla. B. News, Jan. 15, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
19. Muir, supra note 18, at 37.
20. Nejelski, The Jeffersonian-HamiltonianDuality: A Frameworkfor UnderstandingReforms in the Administration of Justice, 64 JUDICATURE 450, 451-52 (1981).
21. Id.
22. Note, Judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study with Proposalsfor Reform, 4
HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 276 (1976); see also Winters, Selection of Judges - An Historical

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss3/6

4

McClellan: Merit Appointment Versus Popular Election: A Reformer's Guide to
FLORIDA'S JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS

under his supervision and control.23 Loyalty to the king, rather than
personal competence determined judicial tenure.2 Because judges
were extremely dependent on monarchal authority, termination of the
king's authority immediately concluded the judicial term,2 and, potentially, the "assistant king's" life, if the new king deemed the judge
overly loyal to the now removed monarchy.26
B.

United States

Initially, the English monarch appointed all American colonial
judges. 27 These judges served at the monarch's pleasure.2 However,
as America began to assert its independence, this dependent relationship changed.2
American revolutionaries recognized the inequity of monarchal appointment in the Declaration of Independence." Among other enumerated grievances, the revolutionaries complained that the king "made
[]udges dependent on his [w]ill alone, for the tenure of their offices,
and the amount and payment of their salaries."3' 1 After obtaining independence, the thirteen original states enacted various forms of judicial
32
selection which abolished individual control of the judiciary.
Of the thirteen original states, seven provided for judicial selection
by the legislature,33 five through appointment by the governor and
council,4 and one, Delaware, by the governor subject to legislative
confirmation. Subsequently, new states entering the Union continued

Introduction, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1966) (stating that equity jurisprudence developed
due to the monarchs' delegation of the "royal judicial function").
23. See Winters, supra note 22, at 1081.
24. See Note, supra note 22, at 276.

25. Id.
26.

W. JONES, POLITICS AND THE BENCH 13-27 (1971).

27. Note, supra note 22, at 276-77.
28. Id.
29.
30.
31.

See Winters, supra note 22, at 1081-82; Note, supra note 22, at 277.
Note, supra note 22, at 277; see Winters, supra note 22, at 1081.
Note, supranote 22, at 277 (citing the Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776)).

32. Winters, supra note 22, at 1081-82; Note, supra note 22, at 277.
33. Winters, supranote 22, at 1082. Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia implemented a legislative process. Id. at 1082 n.3.
34.

Id. at 1082. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland

used forms of gubernatorial appointment. Id. at 1082 n.4. Although some critics accused these
states of retaining an authoritarian method of judicial appointment, the general belief that the
governor was subject to public accountability provided sufficient guarantees of objectiveness.
See W. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 157, 180 (1918).

35. Wimters, supra note 22, at 1082.
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to use legislative or gubernatorial selection until Texas, the twentyninth state, entered the union in 1845.36
The latter half of the nineteenth century brought unparalleled public support for popular government.3 7 Neither Europe nor early
America ever before established an elected judiciary.- Nevertheless,
inevitably led to prothe rising new concept of popular 3sovereignty
9
judges.
elected
popularly
posals for
Because the populace already elected governors and legislators,
the move to democratize government focused on popular election of
the judiciary. 40 Proposals for judicial elections arose more as a manifestation of populist ideology inspired by Andrew Jackson and his contemporaries than as an attempt to improve the judiciary. 41 However, there
remained some supporters of judicial election who believed that appointed judges 42too often reflected the perspectives of the wealthy and
the privileged.

36. Id.; Note, supra note 22, at 277.
37. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 9-10 (1974).
38. See Winters, supra note 22, at 1082.
39. See id. The hardships of emigration and the struggle for survival in a new world placed
a premium on self-reliance and independence. Id. The spirit of experimentation in self-government, reflected in the federal and state constitutions, began to filter down to the selection of
judges. See id.
40. Id.; see also Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges:
The Role of PopularJudicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 35 (Special Issue, May 1986) (stating
that election of the judiciary allowed the courts to rival legislative and executive power through
a base of popular support).
41. W. CARPENTER, supra note 34, at 173-74; Winters, supra note 22, at 1082. Andrew
Jackson rode to power giving new meaning to the expression a "people's president." W. CARPENTER, supra note 34, at 174. His campaign was premised on the popular power of government
in America, and by tapping early immigrants' own hardships with immigration and survival in
a "new world," he found charismatic appeal. Id. With this general consensus of power to the
people, and since governors and legislators were already being popularly elected, the shift to
general elections of judges seemed logical. Id. Professor Evan Haynes observed that:
[The fundamental causes of the change to popular election of the judiciary] had
very little to do with the relative merits of . . . that system of judicial selection
and tenure, but were rather the ideas and impulses of a violent swing toward the
democratization of government generally. The more mature and seasoned countries
of Europe, who experienced the same revolution in government, preserved the
idea that judges should be competently selected, and free of political pressure; but
in America, the ebullient enthusiasm and intemperance of youth and inexperience
carried all before it.

E.

HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES

100-01 (1944).

42. See Hall, ProgressiveReform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The PopularElection of State Supreme CourtJudges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345, 346-48.
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Although some states considered adopting judicial elections before
1845,4 a major shift began in 1846 when New York amended its
constitution to require judicial elections." New York's action "set off
a chain reaction." 4 By 1856, fifteen of the twenty-nine states adopted
judicial elections. 46 Further, all twenty states entering the Union from
1856 until Alaska's entrance in 1959 adopted elected judiciaries. 47 Thus,
the populist ideology effectively penetrated the judicial selection process.
Almost immediately after many states adopted judicial elections,
dissatisfaction with an elected judiciary arose.4 Increasing discontent
with judicial election occurred because large-city political machines
dominated and controlled the partisan electoral process. 49 By the late
nineteenth century, disenchantment with politically abused judicial
elections became widespread ° Roscoe Pound expressed this disenchantment in his famous 1906 address, The Causesof PopularDissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,51 stating: 'Putting courts
into politics, and compelling judges to become politicians, in many
jurisidictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the
2

bench."5

Responding to increasing concern about political partisanship's adverse effects on the judiciary, states developed the nonpartisan ballot
to take "judges out of politics.' ' By eliminating political party identification from judicial elections, states attempted to retain judicial ac-

43. Winters, supra note 22, at 1082. As early as 1812, lower court judges were elected in
Georgia. Id. Mississippi adopted a completely elective judiciary in 1832. Id.
44. Id; Note, supra note 22, at 277-79.
45. Note, supra note 22, at 279.
46. Id.
47. Id.; see also E. HAYNES, supra note 41, at 101-35 (summarizing the state constitutional
history of judicial selection).
48. Winters, supra note 22, at 1083.
49. Id. In the 1860s, New York City's Tammany Hall organization seized control of the
elected judiciary and created a public furor by ousting well-respected and qualified judges and
appointing incompetent ones. Id. Tammany control of the judiciary in New York, and similar
conditions in other states, led to general revulsion against the popular election system. Id.; see
also Landis, Selection of Judges in New York, 56 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 206, 219-24 (1933) (The
Tweed power in the judiciary resulting from the efforts of Tammany Hall led to a vindication
of the elective system.).
50. See Winters, supra note 22, at 1083; Note, supra note 22, at 279-80.
51. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 46
J. Am. JUDICATURE SoOy 55 (1962) (reprinting Pound's address delivered in 1906 to the
American Bar Association).
52. Id. at 66.
53. Winters, supra note 22, at 1083.
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countability to the public, without creating opportunities for political
abuse.' However, removing political partisanship from judicial elections decreased information disseminated to the voting public, and
greatly reduced public participation in these elections.- Thus, the
nonpartisan ballot did not solve the problem of judicial selection.
In 1913, the American Judicature Society was founded by Pound
and others to improve the quality of the judiciary. 6 Albert Kales, also
a founder of the American Judicature Society, was the director of
drafting for the new organization. 57 Kales desired a judicial selection
method "combin[ing] the benefits and avoid[ing] the weaknesses of
both election[s] and [lifetime] appointment[s]."
Under Kales' plan, voters elected a chief justice at frequent intervals. 9 The chief justice then appointed the remaining judiciary.60 However, Kales suggested that these appointments include a probationary
period.6 ' Following this period, each judge would face a noncompetitive
retention election.6
Although Kales did not propose a formal nominating commission,
he did suggest that the chief judge and presiding justices form a
judicial council, which would seek qualified judicial candidates.6 Thus,
Kales' concept of this council resembled the current judicial nominating
commissions.
Since Kales did not specifically recommend a nominating commission, it is inaccurate to refer to the merit plan as Kales' plan.6 The
contemporary appointment scheme differs from Kales' plan in material
respects. Nevertheless, the basic principles of the merit selection

54. See Adamany & Dubois. Electing State Judges, 1976.Wis. L. REv. 731, 756.
55. See id. at 774-76. Effective public participation in selecting judges is diminished in
nonpartisan elective systems because the political advantages of incumbency and the lack of an
organized party opposition allow judges to be easily re-elected. Id. at 774.
56. Winters, supra note 22, at 1083.
57. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure - Its HistoricalDevelopnent, 7 DuQ. L. REV. 61, 63 (1968).
58. Winters, supra note 22, at 1084. Kales believed the chief weakness of the elective
system was its failure to allow intelligent appraisal of a judicial candidate's qualifications. Id.
In contrast, the appointive process pinpointed responsibility for selections, thus encouraging an
evaluation of the candidate's judicial merits. See id.
59. Winters, supra note 57, at 65.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 65-66.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 66-67.
64. Id. at 66.
65. See id.
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and retention plan are found in Kales' historic book, UnpopularGovernment in the United States, written in 1914.66
Nearly twenty-five years after Kales' initial formulation, the American Bar Association endorsed an appointment and retention plan in
1937.67 Three years later, Missouri voted to incorporate an appointment
and retention scheme, now known as the Missouri Plan, into the state
constitution.68
The plan requires the governor to appoint one of three judicial69
candidates whose names are submitted by a nominating commission.
The state supreme court chief justice chairs the commission. 7° Additionally, the governor appoints three lay members and the bar association elects three lawyers to the commission. 71 After an appointed
judge serves for one year, the judge runs in an approval/disapproval
election with no direct competition. 72 After completing each term,
which varies in length depending on the judicial position, the judge
runs in a similar retention election.3 Although Missouri finally adopted
the plan, the primary method of judicial selection in the mid-twentieth
century continued to be legislative or gubernatorial appointment. 74

66. Id.
67. Winters, supra note 22, at 1084. See generally Proceedingsof FourthSession of House
of Delegates, 23 A.B.A. J. 102 (1937) (discussing judicial selection and appointment at the 1937
American Bar Association Meeting).
68. Winters, supra note 22, at 1084. The provision currently appears at Mo. CONST. art.
V, § 25(c)(1). See also McDonald, Missouri's Ideal JudicialSelection Law, 24 J. AAi. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 194, 197-98 (1941) (applauding Missouri's legislature for implementing a merit
selection plan).
69. Watson, Observationson the Missouri NonpartisanCourt Plan,40 Sw. L.J. 1, 2 (1986).
Walker B. Spencer of Louisiana compiled, for the first time, the eight elements of the merit
retention plan:
1. A commission
2. composed of judges
3. and lawyers
4. and laymen
5. to submit nominations
6. to the governor
7. for appointment
8. subject to tenure by non-competitive election.
Winters, supra note 57, at 67.
70. See Winters, supra note 57, at 71.
71. Id.
72. Watson, supra note 69, at 2.
73. See id.
74. See Winters, supra note 22, at 1085.
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Florida

Florida achieved statehood in the 1830s when judicial selection
commonly occurred through gubernatorial and legislative appointment. 75 Under Florida's first Constitution, enacted in 1838,76 the general assembly appointed circuit court judges and supreme court justices
to five year terms.7 7 If thereafter reappointed, these judges held office
for life subject only to requirements of good behavior7 8 In 1852, however, intense public interest in government spurred by the populist
movement led to a constitutional amendment requiring election of
state circuit judges, but not supreme court justices7 9
However, in 1868, the federal government intervened, perceiving
an immediate need to assert authority over the "rebellious" states
following the Civil War.80 Congress initiated militaristic, antidemocratic measures designed to ensure federal government control
and stability of the state government.8 ' The federal Act of 1868 required Florida to convene a state constitutional convention.- Further,
federal authorities presided over the convention. As a result, Florida
amended its Constitution to abrogate the popular election of trial court
judges.- 4 Thereafter, until 1942, the governor appointed judges. 5 The
6
senate confirmed these judges, who served fixed terms.
In 1942, the Florida Constitution again reinstated general election
of trial court judges.87 Florida's failure to restore the judicial election

75. Little, supra note 10, at 3-6; Winters, supra note 22, at 1082. See generally E. HAYNES,
supra note 41, at 101-35 (outlining the constitutional and statutory history of judicial selection
in48 states).
76. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. V, §§ 11-12.
77. Little, supra note 10, at 3.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3940; Little, Is Merit Selection and Retention a Good Idea? No: It's Voter's
Right to Elect, Fla. B. News, Jan. 15, 1990, at 1, col. 4, 11, col. 4. As a result, judicial
accountability shifted from the elective representatives of the people, the general assembly, to
the people themselves. Little, supra note 75, at 40.
80. Little, supra note 10, at 14; see Act of 1868, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
81. Little, supra note 10, at 14; see Act of 1868, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
82. Act of 1868, 14 Stat. 42V,(1867).
83. Id.
84. Little, supra note 10, at. 40. A gubernatorial appointment process remained in effect
for the following 74 years. See id. This reflected, however, a general disinterest in the mode
of judicial selection since constitutional conventions during this time never considered amending
the judicial article regarding the selection of circuit court judges. See generally id. at 15-23
(discussing the history of the judicial article between 1868 and 1942).
85. Id. at 40.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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process before 1942 did not reflect public satisfaction with gubernatorial appointmentas Rather, two world wars and an economic depression
may have distracted public attention from this issue. Since 1942,
Florida citizens have elected trial judges. 89
The selection of supreme court justices by appointment was not
altered by the 1852 constitutional amendment resulting from the
populist movement.90 However, an 1885 amendment restored the election of these justices. 91 Thereafter, for nearly a century, popularly
elected supreme court justices served six year terms. 92 In 1976, after
ninety-one years of general elections, Florida again amended its constitution and instituted a merit appointment and retention plan.93
Under the plan, the Governor appoints to the Florida Supreme
Court one of several candidates selected by a judicial nominating commission. 94 Every seven years, these justices are subject to an electoral
check through noncompetitive retention elections95 Thus, nearly
thirty-nine years after Missouri, Florida adopted its own version of
the American Judicature Society's "merit" appointment plan.9
The Florida Bar strongly advocated Florida's 1976 adoption of merit
selection for supreme court justices.7 The Bar also played a dominant
role in selecting the nominating commission's original members9 8
These commissions provide the narrow list of candidates from which
the governor must make a judicial appointment.9 Due largely to the
Bar's efforts, Florida replaced the direct accountability of appellate
judges with a system instituting indirect accountability.I°° Additionally,

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 16, 40.
91. Id. at 40.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Winters, supra note 22, at 1084.
97. Little, supra note 79, at 10, col. 4. The Florida Bar Association's influence was solidified
by a 1945 Florida Supreme Court ruling that all practitioners before the bar must be members
of the integrated Florida Bar. See In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
The 1956 Constitution further required supreme court justices to be current members of the
Bar and members in good standing for the preceding ten years. Little, supra note 10, at 41.
See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. V, § 13 (1956) (H.R.J. Res. 810, 35th Reg. Sess., 1955 Fla.
Laws 1229, 1239). The 1956 Constitution required the same of circuit court judges, except that
the duration of Bar membership was only five years. Little, supra note 10, at 41.
98. Little, supra note 10, at 41.
99. Id. at 35.
100. Id. at 41; see also Little, supra note 79, at 10, col. 4.
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The Florida Bar advocates extending merit appointment to circuit
judge selection. 101
III.

INHERENT PROBLEMS WITH JUDICIAL SELECTION ANALYSIS

To determine which judicial selection method produces a superior
judiciary, each selection method should be evaluated against competing
methods. 10 2 Choosing a judicial recruitment and retention method inevitably involves comparing what reformers perceive as the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the available alternatives., °3 Each selection method uniquely balances distinctive objectives. '1 Any realistic
assessment of these conflicting objectives suggests that a state's ultimate choice entails unavoidable tradeoffs.10 5 As a result, debate concerning judicial selection evokes strongly held, diverse opinions.
Although opinions about the most effective selection method vary,
extremists at one end of the spectrum believe that judges need to be
completely accountable to the public.10 6 Extremists at the other end
think that judges should have complete discretion and independence. 07
The trade-offs between these polar positions are rarely recognized.- °0
Too often, advocates assume that a judicial selection method primarily
aims to assure judicial independence and to recruit the highest quality
judiciary. 0 9 Although independence and quality are certainly valid objectives, other goals, such as judicial accountability and a broadly

101. COMMISSION ON MERIT SELECTION, supra note 11, at 16, 18-21. Further, The Florida
Academy of Trial Lawyers proposed, unsuccessfully, joint resolutions which sought to create
such an appointment and retention process. See S.J. Res. 698, Reg. Sess. 1990 (entitled "A
[J]oint [R]esolution [P]roposing IA]mendments to [s]ections 10 and 11, [a]rticle V of the State
Constitution, [Rielating to the [S]election of [J]ustices and [J]udges"). Although this resolution
was not passed by the legislature, the formal endorsement of merit selection by the Florida
Bar Commission on Merit Selection and Retention of Trial Judges assured its presence on the
1992 Florida Bar legislative agenda. See COMMISSION ON MERIT SELECTION, supra note 11,
at 16, 18-21.
102. Gunderson, "Merit Selection": The Report and Appraisal of a ParticipantObserver,
10 PAC. L.J. 683, 683-84 (1979).
103. Dubois, supra note 40, at 32.
104. Id.
105. Davidow, Beyond Merit Selection: Judicial Careers Through Merit Promotion, 12
TEX. TECH L. REV. 851, 868-72 (1981).

106.

Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Restraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Re-

tention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1973 (1988).

107. Id.
108. Dubois, supra note 40, at 32. The fundamental purpose of this note is to make these
trade-offs explicit and to assert the legitimacy of all recognizable value choices that go into

judicial selection methods.
109. Id.
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representative judiciary, often go unnoticed. 110 Achieving the best judicial system requires recognizing and considering all value choices
that underpin judicial selections.
In making such a determination, merit selection per se is hardly
controversial. Everyone agrees that one should select judges based
on merit. The controversy concerns which method produces the most
qualified and responsible judiciary. Therefore, since merit selection is
the desired result, labeling a particular method "merit selection" is
misleading."'
Unfortunately, The Florida Bar furthers this misconception by defining "merit selection" as "[a] method for selecting judges solely on
2
the basis of merit rather than through the popular election process.""
The Bar's definition suggests that advocates of the competitive election
process seek to select judges by some criteria other than merit. Taken
to its logical conclusion, this definition could be extended to all democratic elections. Clearly, all advocates believe that their respective
selection method achieves the best balance of accountability and independence, and thus produces the most meritorious judiciary." 3
One should not examine the formal and theoretical methods of
judicial selection without also considering the application of these
methods.1 4 For example, a particular selection method may in theory
limit the abilities of wealthy individuals or a "political machine" to
control judicial selection. However, past experience or empirical information may reveal that the selection process ineffectively accomplishes
its theoretical purposes. 115 Therefore, those considering reform should
recognize that selection methods may function in practice differently
than in theory. 6 Further, the method's results may differ depending
on the jurisdiction where it is implemented. 17 Thus, effective analysis
requires adopting a pragmatic viewpoint to eliminate idealistic misconceptions.

110. Id.
111. McMillian, Selection of State CourtJudges, 40 Sw.L.J. 9, 9 (Special Issue, May 1986).
112. YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION OF THE FLORIDA BAR, MERIT RETENTION OF JUDGES
(1976) (handbook) (cited in Overton, supra note 1, at 10 n.4). The Florida Bar has further
defined merit retention as "[a] method of retaining judges on the bench, solely on the basis of
merit rather than through contested elections." Id.
113. Dubois, supra note 40, at 34-36.
114. Id. at 33 (citing C. DUENT & V. FLANGO, IN SEARCH OF QUALIFIED JUDGES: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE RELEVANCE OF JUDICIAL SELECTION RESEARCH 27-28 (1979)).
115. Cf. Dubois, supra note 40, at 33 (noting a lack of empirical evidence demonstrating
that '"merit" selection methods have removed "politics" from judicial selection).

116. Id. at 34.
117.

Id.
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IV.

DETERMINING THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

Although the populist movement encouraged the concept of a popularly elected judiciary,, 8 judicial elections did not primarily result from
an uncontrolled wave of Jacksonian sentiment." 9 Jurisdictions instituted competitive elections based primarily upon the recommendations
of all-important judicial selection committees.120 These committees
were composed of constitutionally moderate lawyers and judges who
perceived popular elections as consistent with a strong independent
judiciary.' 21 Committee members thought elections would give courts
popular support and credibility, thus allowing courts to more effectively challenge legislative and executive power. Paradoxically, powerful bar associations composed of judges and lawyers eventually led
the judiciary away from electoral control.'23
Initially, state bar associations emerged to promote attorney professionalism.1- Public and professional perceptions regarding the roles
of lawyers and judges shifted, reflecting a view of the law as a separate
authority with unique standards and ideals. 12 As a result, a perception
developed that members of the legal community were best suited to
26
select judges.
Selection standards focused on a judicial candidate's ability to act
independently and ethically while retaining respect for established
precedent. 127 Candidates were evaluated by legal training, experience,

118. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
119. Hall, supra note 42, at 347-48. As Professor Hall explains:
The rise of popular, partisan election of appellate judges is best understood as an
essentially thoughtful response by constitutionally moderate lawyers and judges in
the Whig, Democratic, and Republican parties. .

.

. Lawyers and judges -

not

wild-eyed agrarian and urban radicals - controlled the all-important committees
on the judiciary in the state constitutional 'conventions that adopted popular election.
Id.
120. See id. at 348.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 349-51.
124. Id. at 349.
125. Dubois, supra note 40, at 35.
126. Id. at 35-36. This perception of lawyers and judges as best qualified to select quality
jurists seems to have originally stemmed from scholarly debate on the subject. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 22, at 270-76. But see Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices - Are They Strainable?,
44 TEX. L. REV. 1063, 1066-69 (1966) (reporting that a survey of over 144 judges revealed
their belief that the five most important factors in determining quality judges were moral
courage, decisiveness, reputation for fairness, patience, and good health - none of which seem
to involve characteristics distinct to the practice of law).
127. Dubois, supra note 40, at 35-36.
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and adherence to professional standards rather than a candidate's political, social, and moral values.m The manner employed to reach a
judicial decision was considered more important than the decision's
consequences.m Thus, selection placed emphasis on a judge's proficiency for espousing legal analysis and interpretation, rather than a
judge's ability to formulate practical policy.
Although judges should apply legal principles and precedents, one
cannot escape the reality that judges make social, economic, and political policy.13o The process of selecting appropriate legal principles and
precedents raises underlying questions directly answered by a judge's
personal attitude and values. 13' Through their decisions judges allocate
opportunity, money, liberty, protection, and representation. 132 Accordingly, in a democratic system, judges should be accountable to the
electorate to ensure fair allocation. A judicial selection system which
holds judges publicly accountable may legitimate and reinforce judicial
authority when decisions offend a substantial portion of the citizenry.13
Under such a system, the public may perceive the judiciary as a
unique instrument of popular sovereignty capable of withstanding
legislative and executive challenge, rather than as an oracle of immutable legal principles."M Since judges make policy,1 they should be accountable to the representative political system. 3
In defense, advocates of total judicial insulation argue that accountability will prevent unpopular decisions in cases involving minority

rights and sensitive constitutional issues by subjecting judges to the
popular majority's Will.136 However, no mandate requires nonelected
128. Id..
129. Id. at 36.
130. Adamany & Dubois, supra note 54, at 768. As Justice Cardozo stated: 'The judge as
the interpreter for the community of its sense of law and order must supply omissions, correct
uncertainties, and harmonize results with justice." B. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 16.
131. Dubois, supra note 40, at 38.
132. Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections - NonpartisanPremises with PartisanResults, 32
OHIO ST. L.J. 762, 763 (1971).
133. Dubois, supra note 40, at 38.
134. See id.
135. Adamany & Dubois, supra note 54, at 768.
136. See Ellis, Judges and Politics:Accountability and Independence in an Election Year,
12 N.M.L. REv. 873, 881 (1982) (critiquing the arguments of advocates of judicial elections).
This particular view of the judicial function is not a temporary and transitory phenomenon. It
remains a powerful force for advocates of judicial independence. Dubois, supra note 40, at 36.
As one United States circuit judge stated regarding the judicial role, "[tihis function must be
performed by relying on legal training and knowledge of the law... A judge may not consciously
follow subjective social, political, or economic views if the law requires a contrary result."
Alarcon, PoliticalAppointments and Judicial Independence - An UnreasonableExpectation,
16 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 9, 13 (1983).
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judges to protect the rights of minorities.37 Additionally, constitutional
decisionmaking composes only a small portion of state courts' responsibilities. 1- State judiciaries are more occupied with common law development, statutory interpretation, and the supervision of lower
courts. 139

Yet, assuming an answerable judiciary is a worthwhile objective,
accountability should fulfill several conditions. 140 First, judges should
be accountable either directly to the public or through indirect representation.14' Second, accountability should be regular and periodic.,Third, procedures implemented to check the judiciary should not
obscure the public's ability to choose.1 Effective accountability occurs
when the electorate generally identifies judges with their respective
policies and knows the alternative perspectives.-"
Because views vary concerning the judicial function and the merits
of independence and accountability, states reach different conclusions
about the appropriate balance. 145 The number and variety of schemes
furthers debate of each plan's merit. 146 This debate provokes too many
47
value-laden questions for empirical research to solve satisfactorily.
With such differing views pervasive, one can logically conclude
that those proposing to shift away from democratically selecting
policymaking officials bear the burden of persuasion.' 4 These words
137. See Dubois, supra note 40, at 39.
138. See Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme Courts,
1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 132 (1977).
139. See generally id. at 132-56 (providing a statistical analysis of state supreme court
agendas).
140. Adamany & Dubois, supra note 54, at 768. It is important to recognize that judicial
accountability can occur through varied processes. While popular election clearly subjects judges
to direct public accountability, those supporting appointment argue that accountability may be
achieved indirectly through the appointment of policymakers by those who are periodically
subject to voter approval. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Only four states grant life terms or the equivalent to high court judges, indicating
a general belief in some form of accountability. Id. at 769. Massachusetts justices are appointed
by the Governor for life from a list prepared by a selection commission. Id. at 769 n.96. In
New Jersey, the Governor appoints justices for an initial term of seven years and then reappoints
them for life. Id. The Governor of New Hampshire appoints justices for a term expiring when
they reach the age of 70. Id. In Rhode Island, on the other hand, the legislature names justices
for a life term. Id.
145. Dubois, supra note 40, at 40.
146. Id.
147. But see id. at 41 (arguing that the question of whether elections provide accountability
does lend itself to empirical analysis).
148. Little, supra note 79, at 1, col. 4.
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of Thomas Jefferson reflect the presumption favoring democratic elections: "I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the
society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion
with education."' 49 Thus, the question arises: does merit selection produce a superior judiciary which no degree of public awareness and
education could ever achieve within the democratic election process?
V.
A.

THE MISSOURI PLAN

Theoretical Observation

The merit plan attempts to balance the competing interests of
public accountability and judicial independence.'1 By selecting the best
qualified candidates based on merit and ability, the plan encourages
well-qualified attorneys to consider judicial careers by ensuring independence and long tenure.' 5 ' The merit plan assumes that a segment
of society - lawyers - knows more about judges than any other
segment, and that attorneys "profess"'' 52 a special competence to select
judges.1 Yet acceptance of this assumption developed slowly. '54 Even
at the United States Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin
facetiously suggested that lawyers should nominate judges because
they would "always select the ablest of the profession in order to get
rid of him [from competitive practice]."15 However, the Constitution's
56
framers never seriously considered Franklin's plan.1
Merit plan advocates suggest that while the public should elect
members of the government's legislative and executive branches, in
a free, democratic society, public election of judicial branch members
is illogical. 57 Legislators and governors have constituents who should

149. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept., 28, 1820), reprinted
in J. BARTLETT, FAMLIAR QUOTATIONS 473 (14th ed. 1968).
150. McMillian, supra note 111, at 11.
151. Id.
152. Everett C. Hughes suggests that professions, by their nature, profess. "They profess
to know better than others the nature of certain matters." Hughes, Professions, XCIJ
DAEDALUS 656 (Fall 1963).

153. Watson, Observations on the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, 40 Sw. L.J. 1, 3
(Special Issue, May 1986); see id. at 1-5 (assessing favorably the merit plan for judicial selection).
154. Id. at 1.
155. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 120 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
156. See id. at 120-21.
157. Krivosha, Acquiring Judges by the Merit Selection Method: The Case for Adopting
Such a Method, 40 Sw. L.J. 15, 16 (Special Issue, May 1986).
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popularly elect them. - However, the law prohibits judges from having
constituents.159 Further, a judge who decides a case based on popular
will, rather than merit, faces not only criticism but potential removal.'6
Thus, merit plan advocates conclude that good judgment precludes
popularly electing judges.16 1 A judge should construe the law. If the
law is unpopular, those government branches with constituencies
should change the law.12 Judicial interpretations of the law should be
made without considering popular opinion.'r
However, merit retentionists making this argument must then justify public involvement in judicial retention elections. The plan
paradoxically implements a periodic retention vote by the electorate. rImportantly, this process relates only to judicial tenure, not judicial
selection. Proponents suggest that retention elections effectively provide a degree of public accountability without the accompanying competitive elections.- Retention allows qualified judges to serve long
terms, yet provides the public a mode to remove incompetent judges.'6
Additionally, advocates argue that an effectively implemented
merit plan provides benefits other than a qualified judiciary. Experience discloses that the merit selection process may provide more opportunities for minorities and women than the election process.'6 Instead of diluting minority voting strength through broad districting,'3
the selection process may enable minorities to be appointed to the
6
bench in proportion to their percentage of the population.1
Recognizing these benefits, merit system advocates attempt to
remove the judiciary from the public arena.'70 In theory, the merit
plan seeks to create an independent yet responsible judiciary. Yet in
application, the merit plan produces unsatisfactory results.

158.

Id.

159.

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 3 (1972).

160. Krivosha, supra note 157, at 17.
161. See id. at 18.
162. Id. ("[U]nless and until the public succeeds in convincing the other two branches of
government to bring about a change, the judicial branch is dutybound to follow the law.").
Although this note questions the validity of this reasoning, it remains the fundamental premise
of those calling for judicial independence and insulation. See Alarcon, supra note 136, at 13.
163. See Krivosha, supra note 157, at 18.
164. See McMillian, supra note 111, at 2 (briefly describing the merit plan).
165. Remsen, supra note 13, at 9, col. 1.
166. Id.
167. Krivosha, supra note 157, at 19.
168. See id.
169. See id.; Overton, supra note 1, at 20.
170. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
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B.

PracticalApplication

Although theoretically the Missouri plan seems ideal, in practice
the plan is disturbingly flawed. Initially, the plan seeks to remove
politics from the judicial selection process. Instead of candidates engaging in sleek, expensive campaigning, a qualified nominating commission
selects candidates.' 7 ' However, no empirical evidence demonstrates
1
that merit selection removes politicking from judicial selection.

The merit plan does not eliminate partisan politics from judicial
selection. 1 In Florida, the appellate nominating procedure has merely
shifted the partisan and political components of judicial selection into

private arenas.'7 Former Florida nominating commission members
recount potential candidates' frequent and aggressive lobbying of the

nominating commission.17 This lobbying includes visits to commissioners by the candidates themselves, and pressure exerted upon the

commissioners through clients, relatives, and influential community
leaders. 76 While the law imposes monetary ceilings and disclosure
requirements for public campaign contributions in competitive elections, secret and aggressive lobbying used by merit plan candidates
goes undetected.17 As a result, merit selection has evolved into a

lobbying contest rather than a merit contest. 178

171. See Krivosha, supra note 157, at 16.
172. Dubois, supra note 40, at 33.
173. See Troutman, FloridaJudicial Nominating Commissions, 54 FLA. B.J. 534 (1980)
(arguing that Florida's use of judicial nominating committees has not removed politics from the
judicial selection process).
174. Id. at 536. Mr. Troutman, a member of the judicial nominating commission, discussed
both personal experiences and those related by other commission members. See id. at 534-36.
175. Id. at 534.
176. Id. A revealing description of the lobbying process was recounted in the Kansas City
Star
The hardest test of a judicial commissioner comes in his ability to withstand the
heat. As soon as a vacancy occurs in the court the campaigns start. Friends of
candidates solicit long lists of supporters for their men. Telephones jangle day and
night. Close personal or political friends of the commissioners are urged to telephone
recommendations and to bear down on them. The bush is beaten for every possible
influence.
Kansas City Star, Aug. 16, 1947 (quoted in R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF
THE BENCH AND BAR, JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NoN-PARTISAN COURT

PLAN 87 (1969)).
177. See Spears, Selection of Appellate Judges, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 501, 509-14 (1988).
Justice Spears, a present member of the Texas Supreme Court, takes a strong stand in his

adamant support of the popular election of judges. See id. at 502.
178. Id. (quoting from MISSOURI SENATE INTERIM COMaM. ON THE NONPARTISAN COURT
PLAN, 2d Sess. at ii (1986)).
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The Governor's significant role creates additional merit selection
problems. 17 The Governor must select one of three candidates chosen
by the nominating commission. 18° However, the Governor's dominant
influence over the commission often allows the Governor to control
the list of nominees.'18 Thus, the Governor can assert political influence
to reward personal friends and political supporters.,, Alternatively,
the nominating commission can work against the Governor, employing
"panel rigging" and "panel-loading."' 1 Choosing a nominee panel with
only one legitimate candidate constitutes "panel-rigging," and gives
the Governor no real choice.'4 "Panel-loading" occurs when the Governor disfavors all the candidates presented by the commission, but
appoints one candidate less undesirable than the others.'1
Demonstrating the Governor's influential role in the selection process, the Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court attributes his
position to having been the appointing governor's law school roommate
and friend.18 Additionally, controversy erupted in Missouri when the
Governor appointed his thirty-three year old aide, who never practiced
law, to the state's highest court. 8 7 As a Missouri legislator recognized,
"[t]here was no attempt to hide the fact [that] this was a political
appointment."' x
These examples show that the appointment process has not removed partisan politics from judicial selection. Instead, politicking
occurs outside the public's view. Large campaign contributors can give
funding support to the governor's race and to others on the selection
committees and thereby hide their political influence on the selection
process.'8 9 Then, if a judicial vacancy arises, the supporter can pressure
the Governor and the commissioners to make a political appointment.
Critics of merit selection argue that a judicial selection system
should not avoid only the outward appearance of impartiality.90 The

179. See id. at 511-13.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 511 (quoting from Glick, The Promise and Performance of the Missouri Plan:
JudicialSelection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509, 521 (1978)).
183. See R. WATSON & R. 'DOWNING, supra note 176, at 107-09.
184. Id. at 107.
185. Id.
186. Spears, supra note 177, at 512.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Elder, Missouri Judicial Plan a Questionable Export, 2 TEx. LAW. 17,
July 21, 1986, at 1, col. 3).
189. Spears, supra note 177, at 514.
190. See id. at 524-25; Note, supra note 22, at 303-04.
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system should also strive to eliminate internal corruption. 91 Judicial
elections may sometimes spawn public distrust. However, elections

constitute a direct form of public accountability, and provide an outlet
for citizen response. 192 In contrast, merit appointment, which also potentially generates a distrustful electorate, provides a less viable mode

for citizen action.1 9s

While the retention election scheme purportedly assures judicial
accountability, retention elections in other states are generally ineffective.'' One commentator describes judicial recall as "a statistical rarity." 95 From 1934 to 1979, voters recalled only thirty-three judges
subject to retention election.'9 Between 1972 and 1978, electors retained 98.4% of all appointed judges. 197 Further, some of the rare

instances of judicial removal reveal dubious motives, such as controversial decisions, exposed personal problems, or differing judicial
philosophies. 9
In Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice Leander Shaw's 1990 retention election, anti-abortion advocates sought to remove the Chief

Justice because he authored a judicial opinion striking down a statute
which required parental consent for minors to obtain abortions.' 99 Although a significant majority of all lawyers and judges believed he
was an effective justice,'20 critics vigorously challenged Chief Justice

Shaw because of one controversial legal opinion. 20' As a result, over
40% of Florida electors voted to recall the Chief Justice. 2 2 Unfortunately, this example demonstrates that retention elections may only
seriously challenge judges when a powerful political organization
exploits public passion concerning a narrow legal issue. 2 3

191. See Spears, supra note 177, at 524-25; Note, supra note 22, at 303-04.
192. See Spears, supra note 177, at 524-25.
193. See id.
194. Id. See generally Carbon, JudicialRetention Elections: Are They Serving Their Intended Purpose?, 64 JUDICATURE 210, 217-18 (1980) (examining how judicial retention elections
have functioned in states which have adopted this scheme).
195. Little, supra note 79, at 10, col. 4 (citing Griffin & Horan, Merit Retention Elections:
What Influences the Voters?, 63 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 78, 79 (1979)).
196. Carbon, supra note 194, at 221.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Abortion Foes Fail to Oust Shaw, Gainesville Sun, Nov. 7, 1990, at 6A, col. 1.
200. Telephone Interview with Julie Stafford, Research Assistant, The Fla. Bar (Nov. 14,
1991). A survey of 5,145 lawyers revealed that 4,712 (92%) favor retention. Id.
201. Abortion Foes Fail to Oust Shaw, supra note 199, at 6A, col. 1.
202. Id.
203. See Spears, supra note 177, at 516 (recounting the unseating of Chief Justice Rose
Bird and two of her colleagues on the California Supreme Court).
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Merit system critics also point out that 97.8% of judicial nominating

commissioners have been white .2 Nevertheless, merit system proponents argue that Florida's appointment procedure effectively establishes minority and female representation as jurists.2°5 Some statistical
evidence reveals that more blacks and women receive judgeships in
Florida through merit appointment than competitive election.206 Retentionists argue that these statistics about Florida judicial appointments
mirror a national trend whereby more women and minority judges
are appointed rather than elected. ° 7 However, while minorities constitute approximately one-quarter of Florida's population, only 5.5% of
Florida's 723 judges belong to minority groups. 208 Further, four of

Florida's five district courts of appeal, whose judges are appointed
rather than elected, have no minority judges. 2 - Thus, Chief Justice
Shaw concludes, that "there is a perception that minorities are underrepresented on the bench due in part to the fact that they are underrepresented on the nominating committees. '' 210 Chief Justice Shaw

further observes that while merit selection should be an avenue for
talented minority members to become judges, in practice it appears
every bit as political and potentially discriminatory as the election
2 11

process.

Another flaw arises because under the merit system, unlike a competitive election, there is no contestant. A contestant causes candidates
to take positions, thus giving the voters choices. 2 12 However, the re-

tention election fails to raise issues which provide voters with legitimate alternatives.213 With no alternatives, retention is expected,

whereas in political elections, the outcome is oftentimes doubtful after
2
the entry of the second contestant.

14

204. Id. at 514 (quoting from Memorandum Report to John Hill, Mexican American Legal
Defense and Education Fund, at 3-5 (Nov. 26, 1986)).
205. Remsen, supra note 18, at 9, col. 1; Overton, supra note 1, at 20.
206. Remsen, supra note 18, at 9, col. 1; Overton, supra note 1, at 20 (Justice Overton
states that 19 out of 23 black judges and 41 out of 71 women judges were appointed to the
bench through the merit selection process).
207. See Overton, supra note 1, at 20; Krivosha, supra note 157, at 19.
208. Integrating the Bench, Gainesville Sun, Mar. 4, 1991, at 8A, col. 1.
209. Id.
210. Id.; see infra Author's Note.
211. Integrating the Bench, supra note 208, at 8A, col. 1.
212. Spears, supra note 177, at 516.
213. Id.
214. Burnett, Observations on the Direct Election Method of Judicial Selection, 44 TEx.
L. REV. 1098, 1099 (1966) ("In political combat, as in speed contests among horses, the outcome
becomes doubtful only after the entry of the second contestant.").
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Merit retention elections also fail to eliminate high-cost re-election
campaigns. 215 Although one problem recognized earlier was the ability
of large contributors to effectively shield their "judicial" donations,
216
retention schemes additionally do not necessarily conserve money.
Electors ousted three supreme court justices in California's 1986 retention elections in which campaign expenditures reached ten million dollars.217 Although a Florida re-election campaign probably could not be
as costly because of campaign contribution laws,218, individual donation

caps create an additional problem. A judge's inability to acquire sufficient funding oftentimes forces judges to contribute substantial personal funds to their re-election campaigns.219 As a result, judges with
personal wealth have a significant advantage. Thus, although merit
retention elections attempt to effectuate accountability without detrimental political influence, practical application reveals a thoroughly
political process.
VI.

THE POPULAR ELECTION OF JUDGES

A.

Theoretical Observation

Two principal arguments support elective judicial selection: the
openness of elections and the appeal of political competition. 0 Citing
America's republican tradition,2' judicial election proponents claim
that this process is the most open and straightforward selection

215. Spears, supra note 177, at 514.
216. Id.; see Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes
the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 58-72, app. A, tables 1-7
(1985) (surveying and analyzing the substantial sums devoted to financing general and retention
election campaigns).
217. Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 1986,
at 8, col. 4.
218. See FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1) (Supp. 1990). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) No person, political counittee, or committee of continuous existence shall
make contributions to any candidate or political committee in this state, for any
election, in excess of the following amounts:
(e) To a candidate for county court judge or circuit judge, $1,000.
(f) To a candidate for retention as a judge of a district court of appeal, $2,000.
(g) To a candidate for retention as a justice of the Supreme Court, $3,000.
Id.
219. See, e.g., Remsen, supra note 18, at 1, 8 (describing how one candidate for circuit
court judge in Dade County spent $300,000 of her own funds).
220. Note, supra note 22, at 285.
221. See Spence, Should Judges Be Selected by Merit Plan?No, 40 FLA. B.J. 1147, 1149-52
(1966).
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method.- Further, voter participation produces a representative and
accountable judiciary.- Additionally, since judges participate in political life, competitive political election works best to educate the public
about judicial candidates.To evaluate whether elections adequately hold judges accountable,
Proponents and critics of
one must define judicial accountability.
judicial elections define judicial accountability differently. Critics deny
that judicial elections create accountability, stressing: minimal voters'
interest in judicial election; minimal voters' knowledge about judicial
candidates; voters' ignorance concerning judicial performance records;
and the absence of meaningful competition.2 6 Therefore, critics argue
that the election process fails to maintain judicial accountability because voters do not know for whom or what they are voting.2 7
Proponents of popular elections, however, argue that these criticisms fundamentally misconceive the purpose of elections, and the role
voters play in selecting governmental officials.-s While critics believe
that voters should make well-informed decisions by assessing a judicial
candidate's specific policy stands, popular election proponents disagree.2 Proponents suggest that elections should allow voters to control the general direction and broad boundaries of public policy.2
Voters indirectly influence public policy by retrospectively judging an
individual judge's performance and by selecting candidates that share
voters' fundamental interests and values.-1 So long as judicial elections
allow voters to exercise this judgment at regular and periodic intervals, and provide voters with a choice among opposing candidates,
elections secure accountability of elected officials.-2
Voter participation in judicial elections is as meaningful, effective,
and rational as voter participation in other types of elections.m Critics

222. Note, supra note 22, at 285.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Dubois, supra note 40, at 41.
226. Id.
227. P. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 33 (1980).
228. Dubois, supra note 40, at 41.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 41-42. See generally Adamany & Dubois, supra note 54 (examining judicial
voting from the perspective of broader election theory).
233. Dubois, supra note 40, at 42. See generally Lovrich, Pierce & Sheldon, Citizen Knowledge and Voting in Judicial Elections, 73 JUDICATURE 28 (1989) (examining the efficacy of
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frequently point to research showing voters lack the interest in and
knowledge about judicial candidates necessary to make intelligent voting decisions.23 However, research also consistently demonstrates that
knowledgeable voters vote more often and voters know more about
candidates than nonvoters23 As a result, popular elections do not
gather the uneducated masses, but rather attract a self-selected group
of insightful voting participants.2 These voters distinguish themselves
from the general public by having an uncommon interest in public
affairs, by following local judicial affairs, and by their general knowledge of government.2 7 Voters exercising their right to select judges
possess the necessary interest, knowledge, and experience to enable
3
effective accountability to occur through the voting process.m
Proponents of judicial elections recognize the inherent paradox of
this argument. This argument supports democratic election of judges,
yet favors low voter turnout. However, proponents stress that most
voters commonly do not find judicial elections salient.2m9 Thus, few
voters sufficiently educate themselves about the candidates.2 ° Therefore, advocates suggest that effective accountability occurs when those
voters reasonably knowledgeable about the candidates actually exercise their right to vote.241
Moreover, most research indicates that since those voting are educated about the candidates, increasing public education, media coverage, and information will dramatically increase voter participation in
judicial elections.2 Therefore, advocates suggest reform measures to
educate and motivate the voting populous.m
Highly competitive and controversial judicial elections prompt voters to learn about candidates, to correctly match candidates with issue

efforts to influence voters in judicial elections); Sheldon & Lovrich, Knowledge and Judicial
Voting: The Oregon and Washington Experience, 67 JUDICATURE 235 (1983) (examining issues
of voter knowledge and information in judicial elections in Oregon and Washington).
234. Dubois, supra note 40, at 42; see Lovrich, Pierce & Sheldon, supra note 233, at 28-29;
McMillian, supra note 111, at 10.
235. Dubois, supra note 40, at 48; see Lovrich, Pierce & Sheldon, supranote 233, at 30, 33.
236. Lovrich, Pierce & Sheldon, supra note 233, at 33.
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. Dubois, supra note 40, at 43.
240. Id.
241. See Lovrich, Pierce & Sheldon, supra note 238, at 33 ('While the average reader of
the local paper or listener to the news may not be much interested [in judicial contests], it is
certain that the likely voter will be drawn to a discussion of the issues in the races.").
242. See id; Dubois, supra note 40, at 43-44.
243. Lovrich, Pierce & Sheldon, supra note 233, at 33.
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positions, and to vote accordingly.- However, the Florida Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Codes)
inhibit judicial-election controversy and competition.2 5 These Codes
limit a judicial candidate's fund-raising ability and, more importantly,
restrict a candidate's ability to debate substantive legal issues that
6
lead voters to perceive that they have an interest in the outcome. 24
Critics suggest that the Codes fail to achieve faithfulness to the
electoral process and to maintain the appearance of judicial impartial7
ityYBy restricting campaign appearances and political advocacy, the
Codes preclude judicial candidates from presenting meaningful information to the electorate.-s
As interpreted, the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits public debates between competing candidates, prohibits statements concerning
a candidate's anticipated conduct in office, curtails responses to questionnaire surveys, and precludes statements concerning the candidate's
or the opponent's performance.- Thus, the code blocks an adequate
information flow to allow the electorate to knowledgeably judge
judges.2
Also, campaign financing restrictions raise additional questions
about judicial impartiality.? 1 In Florida, campaign contributions have
generated public concern since the state adopted judicial elections. 52
The Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval two reasons for this
concern: "The tendency or possibility to create a quid pro quo relationship, and . . . the creation of an appearance of influence [or] corrup-

244. Dubois, supra note 40, at 43.
245. Alfini & Brooks, Ethical Constraints on Judicial Election Campaigns:A Review and
Critique of Canon 7, 77 Ky. L.J. 671, 718-19 (1988-89) (although this work takes a national
perspective, the authors use the Florida Supreme Court Committee on Standards of Conduct

Governing Judges as an interpretative tool); see FLORIDA

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

66 (1991); FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 589 (1991).
246. See Alfini & Brooks, supranote 245, at 683-718 (analyzing the practical effects of Code
restrictions on campaign advocacy and fund raising).
247. Id. at 672, 718-22.
248. Id. at 718; see also Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions
on CampaignSpeech by Candidatesfor Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1987) (arguing
that Code restrictions on campaign speech violate the First Amendment and examining how
these restrictions impact the issue of judicial selection).
249. Alfini & Brooks, supra. note 245, at 718-19; Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct
Governing Judges, Ops. 78-6, -13 (1978), 80-13 (1980), 84-10, -17, -18 (1984).
250. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 245, at 719.
251. Id. at 718.
252. Id. at 718-19.
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tion." 2 s However, Florida's legislature virtually eliminated this problem by enacting a campaign finance limitation law which limits campaign contributions,25 and by enacting a contribution disclosure law.-s
Popular elections proponents argue that adequate accountability
cannot occur without competitive elections.25 However, Code restrictions prohibit political campaigning by judicial candidates. Therefore,
low voter turnout by a knowledgeable electorate should be recognized
to effectuate judicial accountability until effective reform measures
are taken to spark voter interest.2 7
Thus, proponents argue that judicial elections are desirable to
achieve judicial accountability.m Judicial elections enable voters to
associate judges generally with the decisions they make. Further,
voters will associate candidates with those decisions they will likely
make as judges. Judicial elections, like other elections, effectively
maintain popular control over governmental decisionmaking's outer
limits. Unfortunately, while theoretically ideal, in practice judicial elections and democracy can be repeatedly disturbing.
B.

PracticalApplication

Perhaps money can buy justice.2 9 Critics cite a series of campaign
contributions to Supreme Court of Texas justices.260 Texaco representatives contributed campaign funds totaling $72,700 to seven justices
while an appeal in the $11 billion Pennzoil lawsuit against Texaco was
pending before'the court.2 1 Pennzoil lawyers countered, contributing
$315,000 to their campaigns.20 Further, four justices who received
contributions from the parties did not even face re-election.m
These practices inevitably raise questions about an elected
judiciary's integrity and impartiality. 214 Even if a judge can maintain
253.

MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, 565 So. 2d 1332, 1335-36 (Fla. 1990) (quoting

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976)).
254.

See FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1) (Supp. 1990); supra note 218 for text of statute.

255. See FLA. STAT. § 105.08 (1989).
256. See Dubois, supra note 40, at 41.
257. See Lovrich, Pierce & Sheldon, supra note 233, at 33 (noting that jurists and candidates
have taken a restrictive review of the Code and suggesting that this has hindered voter interest

in judicial elections).
258.
259.

Dubois, supra note 40, at 34.
See Kaplan, What Price Justice? Oh About $10,000, Wash. Post, May 17, 1987, at C1,

col. 1.
260.
261.
262.

See id.
Id.
Id.

263.

Id.

264.

Alfini & Brooks, supra note 245, at 671.
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integrity, public perception of the judiciary may diminish. 2 - As men-

tioned earlier, Florida statutorily limits campaign contributions.2 6 Yet,
financing and campaigning still occur. Additionally indicating impropriety, The Florida Bar estimates that lawyers make at least 80% of

contributions to judicial campaigns in Florida.26 7 A system cannot eliminate the appearance of impropriety when nonpartisan judges run competitive political elections financed by the lawyers appearing before
2
them. 6

The Florida Supreme Court ruled that campaign contributions by
appearing counsel do not create a legally sufficient ground for judicial
disqualification.2 6 9 However, it may be unrealistic to expect a litigant
to believe that an adversary's prior contribution has not created judicial bias.27 ° Critics argue that the competitive election process cannot

eliminate this problem.-,
Additionally, in popular urban areas, judicial elections may reflect
popularity and name recognition more than competency.2 For example, in Dade County, Florida, MacKenzie, a female judicial candidate

possessing no courtroom experience, ran against Dellapa, an acclaimed
judge.27 3 One month before the election, a Miami Herald article related

MacKenzie's lack of experience and her recent bout with alcoholism.MacKenzie won by a comfortable 25,000 votes.

5

An "all-American"

265. See id. Professor Schotland also discusses the large number of judges selected by
election. Schotland, supra note 216, at 72-73. He estimates that in 1984, over 7,400 judges were
held accountable by election in the 39 states that elect some or all of their judges. Id. at 73.
266. See FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1) (Supp. 1990); supra note 218 for text of statute.
267. Bar Seeks Stay in JudicialContributionsCase, Fla. B. News, Oct. 15, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
268. Remsen, supra note 18, at 8.
269. See MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, 565 So. 2d 1332, 1340 (Fla. 1990); supra
notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
270. MacKenzie, 565 So. 2d at 1341-43 (Overton, J., concurring in result only). As Judge
Cope reasoned in the Third District Court of Appeal's majority decision in favor of disqualification:
The inquiry here is not one of policy, but rather the fundamental right to a fair
[T]he sole issue before us is whether the litigant has
trial in a fair tribunal ....
articulated a well-founded, non-frivolous fear that he will not receive a fair trial.
...We are not at liberty to ignore an otherwise well founded fear, based upon
possible collateral consequences of our ruling. The overriding priority, reflected in
the substantive law, is to assure that our courts are impartial, and that they have
the appearance of impartiality. On that the credibility of the judiciary depends.
Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1172 (3d D.C.A. 1989), modified 565 So. 2d 1332
(Fla. 1990).
271. See Remsen, supra note 18, at 8.
272. Id. at 1, 8.
273. Id. at 8.
274. Id.
275.

Id.
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name and subsequent newspaper exposure may aid a candidate, despite
the article's content. 6
Judicial elections perhaps face the most serious criticism because
elections deter potentially high-quality jurists from seeking judicial
positions.m Good politicians often do not make good judges, and good
judges often do not make effective politicians. 8 Some critics argue
further that the characteristics making a good judge often preclude
that individual's ability to be a good politician. 9 Therefore, competitive elections will not produce the best judiciary. Instead, the best
jurists will decide not to participate in a "circus-like" election atmosphere. 10
Judicial elections, therefore, do not select the most responsible and
responsive public servants.2 1 By their nature, elections undermine
acquiring such judges.2 A highly qualified candidate's survival is more
a tribute to the candidate's personal stamina, rather than the popular
election system's success.2
Finally, the judicial election process is inefficient.2 The time,
money, and energy expended relate only minimally to selecting a qualified judiciary.2 Thus, critics argue, competitive political elections do
not belong in a nonpolitical judicial system.
VII.

CONCLUSION

American attitudes about judicial selection embody expectations
about the judiciary's role in a democratic society. The system needs
to provide judges sufficient independence and insulation. This independence and insulation enables judges to check the legislative and executive branches using the powers specifically delegated to the judiciary.
Further, judges are able to safeguard fundamental individual rights
and liberties, and perhaps guard society's long-term interests against

276. See id.
277. Id; Krivosha, supra note 157, at 19.
278. Remsen, supra note 18, at 8.
279. See id.

280. Id.
281. See generally Krivosha, supra note 157 (arguing that judicial elections fail in their
purpose).
282. See supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
283. See Remsen, supra note 18, at 8.
284. Note, supra note 22, at 296. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE LAW 320-56 (1972) (providing a general exposition of the law and economics approach to
judicial proceedings).
285. Note, supra note 22, at 296.
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temporary popular passions. At the same time, however, citizens desire accountable judges who faithfully administer criminal and civil
laws enacted by elected representatives, and who make decisions that
the majority believes best protect the population's health, safety, welfare, morals, and well-being.
These goals conflict. With independence, judges enjoy longer terms
than their legislative and executive branch counterparts. With accountability, most states still use popular election to initially select and
subsequently retain judges.
Modern legal scholars and social scientists recognize that judges
make policy. Therefore, accountability is assumably desirable. The
key dispute concerns which judicial selection method best provides
effective accountability while encouraging the most qualified jurists
to seek judicial positions. This dispute raises the argument between
merit retention and popular elections. Unfortunately, no perfect
method exists. Each plan has inherent problems. Determining which
method to apply requires recognizing American government's presumption favoring democratic selection.
Florida Supreme Court Justice Ben F. Overton, a staunch merit
selection advocate, summarizes the selectionist's view that electing
judges is poor policy.26 The intrinsic problem with this view is that
it universally applies to all democratic selection forms. Any incumbent
public official would prefer to forego the inconvenient and awkward
chores of raising money and campaigning. Further, the primal content
and rising costs of American politicking disturb most voters. Yet the
unsightly characteristics do not justify abolishing democracy. Winston
Churchill wisely stated:
Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried
in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy
is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy
is the worst form of government, except all those other
7
forms that have been tried from time to time.Lawyers, of all people, should understand that there is no good substitute for self-government. Justice and freedom cannot endure without
democracy. Critics argue that judges differ from other public officials,
and the judiciary requires a different selection method. However, no

286. See Electing Judges Is Poor Policy, Overton Tells Panel, Fla. B. News, May 1, 1989,
at 4, col. 1.
287. Speech by Winston S. Churchill in the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), reprinted
in RESPECTFULLY QUOTED 83 (S. Platt ed. 1989).
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evidence indicates that Floridians would benefit by an appointed
judiciary subject to token retention elections. No persuasive arguments support imposing indirect judicial accountability through merit
appointment and retention. Therefore, direct accountability through
elections is preferable, giving the public control over the government's
judicial branch. Partisan elections assure opposition, generate vigorous
criticism of those in power, and effectively present alternative policy
choices. Although democratic government is inefficient, inefficiency is
not a compelling reason which justifies abolishing the public's inherent
right to choose. Moreover, the arguments favoring merit retention,
when rebutted, produce no other compelling reason to abolish competitive judicial elections. Although The Florida Bar's recommendation
supports merit selection, the evidence does not. Therefore, the Florida
Legislature should not only reject merit selection but restore the democratic election process to all judicial levels.m
Madison B. McClellan*

288. This is not to say that the election process should be held intact without being reformed.
Justice Spears has suggested a variety of measures that could improve the competitive election
process in Florida including: (1) public financing; (2) voter information booklets; (3) judicial
qualifications and standards; (4) nominating committees; (5) single-member or small-member
districts to reduce campaign costs; and (6) increased judicial salaries. Spears, supra note 177,
at 521-24.
*Authr'sNote: Recent events have diminished hopes of retaining popular election for selecting Florida's judges. The United States Supreme Court, in Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354
(1991), held that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to state judicial elections. Id. at 2368.
The Court found that the phrase, "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice," includes the election of judges. Id. at 2362-67. Justice Stephens, writing
for the six judge majority, expressed in dicta the Court's view that the character of the judicial
office "cannot be resolved by crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while
simultaneously requiring them to run for elected office." Id. at 2367. Further, the Court implicitly
encouraged the use of merit selection and retention to select judges by commenting that a state
could exclude its judiciary from coming under the Voting Rights Act by appointing, rather than
electing, judges. Id. Thus, Chisom suggests that, if a minority group can prove that at-large
voting districts diminish its ability to elect "representatives" of its choice, then federal judges
could impose single-member electoral districts on all state judicial elections. See generally Note,
Fair and Effective Voting Strength Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: The Impact of
Thornburg v. Gingles on Minority Vote Dilution Litigation, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 303 (1987)
(stating that circuit-wide elections of judges impermissibly dilute the voting power of minorities,
thus requiring small judicial elections in subdistricts). There are presently two federal lawsuits
pending in Florida challenging the fairness of at-large judicial elections. Brennan, Will It Be
Judges or Politicians or Both?, Tampa Tribune, Aug. 4, 1991, at Commentary-i, col. 2.
Additionally, to reduce the appearance of white male dominance on the judicial nominating
commissions, Florida's Governor, Lawton Chiles, with the help of The Florida Bar, has introduced
23 new members representing minorities to Florida nominating commissions. See A Move Toward
More Black Judges, Tampa Tribune, Aug. 4, 1991, at Commentary-4, col. 1. These appointments
increase the percentage of blacks on the commission statewide from 8% to 19%, and the percent-
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age of Hispanic members to 4.4%. Id. Although the new appointments increase minority representation on the influential nominating commissions statewide, because the commissions select
candidates by majority vote, the appointments still may be inadequate. See SuP. CT. NOMINATING COMM. RULES OF PROCEDURE § VI (1991); UNIFORM RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR DIST.
CTS. OF APP. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM. § V (1991). At a minimum, however, these
minority appointments advance an image that merit selection grants minority groups greater
legitimacy and power in the selection process. These appointments may also increase the likelihood that The Florida Bar can effectively lobby to remove the popular election of Florida's judges.
Because removing popular election of trial judges will require an amendment to Florida's
Constitution, it is difficult to determine the motivation behind these appointments. Governor
Chiles may have made these appointments to legitimately increase minority influence in the
judicial selection process. On the other hand, the Governor may want to create the appearance
of a nondiscriminatory selection process to encourage the public to vote in favor of removing
all state judges from the popular election process. Certainly, these new appointments, together
with the Chisom decision, will be used effectively by The Florida Bar in its attempt to remove
the popular election of Florida's trial judges.
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